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Three major thinkers of theatre, Erving Goffman, Marvin Carlson and Bruce 
Wilshire, admit that theatre is an essential and central metaphor for life. 
Nevertheless, the two main questions of their discussion are, on the one hand, 
the existence of a range of moral criteria and values that differentiates the two 
worlds and, on the other, the possibility of defining the threshold between 
theatre and life. 
According to Bruce Wilshire’s theory, theatre is an essential and central 
metaphor for life, since, “when we begin our investigation of human identity 
in life offstage, we find that the full and natural expression of its conditions 
are in theatre-like terms”. He notes that theatre “has already written large 
the process by which we become ourselves offstage” and he admits that “life 
is theatre-like”. Considering that we always display ourselves to others, “we 
must understand something of their response to this display if we would be 
ourselves”1. What blooms onstage under the audience’s intense gaze may 
reveal similar behaviors in similar behavior offstage.  At this point, where 
the theatrical metaphor is transferred from the poetic and rhetoric to a 
gnoseological dimension, Wilshire will agree with Erving Goffman, who 
maintains that although the entire “real” world is not a theatre, we can not 
easily define their difference2. In fact, if the point beyond which we can not 
characterize a situation as a theatrical one is indistinct, then the point of 
distinction between this situation and the theatre is equally indistinct. 
Nevertheless, even if Wilshire agrees with the two parts of Goffman’s 
acceptance, namely, that the world is not identified with the theatre and 
that we can not easily define their difference, he believes that there is a 
                                                
1 B. Wilshire, Role playing and identity. The limits of theatre as metaphor, Indiana Univer-
sity Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1991, pp. 243-244. 
2 E. Goffman, La mise en scène de la vie quotidienne, 1. La présentation de soi, Les Éditions 
de Minuit, Paris 1973, p. 73. 
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range of moral criteria and values that differentiates the two worlds. 
Moreover, his criticism of Goffman will begin from this precise range. 
If we observe his movements in sequence, we will find that he carefully 
prepares his steps, examining both aspects of the metaphor through their 
mutual relations – more or less as Georges Gurvitch had suggested several 
years earlier: how the world of theatre is related to reality and -at the same 
time- how reality reveals a theatrical structure3. Hence, theatre can 
complement the non-artistic modes of discovering the world in order that it 
reveals many aspects of our everyday life, but that it can not clearly reveal 
is precisely the limits of its ability to reveal4. This weakness is due to the 
fact that in theatre the imaginary element is interwoven with the real 
element to a certain degree that the similarities between the theatrical and 
real world seem almost self-evident. We can approach these similarities 
based on certain central concepts. The first concept that we come across 
during the theatrical metaphor is that of the “role”. Its long-standing and 
considerably frequent presence does not allow us to discern with certitude in 
which specific field it is used literally and in which metaphorically. 
Considering that the concept of the role is used metaphorically in relation to 
the real world, we should accept that a “companion metaphor” is constantly 
by its side, that of the general public or of the audience5. Not only does the 
audience “accompany” the role, but the role itself is not even meant without 
the existence of some spectators viewing its activation and development. 
However, the development of a role, (and at this point the second companion 
metaphor is located), also presupposes the existence of a “script”, as many 
sociologists and therapists of the transactional method support. The script is 
the backbone of the role: I learn a role means that I learn to react to a 
sequence of anticipated reactions and behaviors, as I act in the framework of 
a story and a plot. However the scripts are not “written” from the beginning, 
each time a role is activated, but they pre-exist as stored up experiences and 
knowledge that have been established by society. These acquired 
experiences and knowledge are rendered by the third companion metaphor 
                                                
3 G. Gurvitch, “Sociologie du théâtre”, Les Lettres Nouvelles, 34-36, 1956, pp. 196-210. 
4 B. Wilshire, Role playing and identity, cit., p. 52. 
5 Ivi, p. 259. 
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of “tape”. As Wilshire argues, “tapes of the past” play themselves out in our 
behavior without our knowing it”6. 
Hence, these central metaphors unite the two worlds while 
simultaneously projecting their similarities and their analogies. The real 
world constitutes the substrate of every behavior either onstage or offstage. 
The theatrical stage is basically as equally real as any other social situation, 
while a social situation can be mapped as theatrical, as long as it is be 
framed as such, namely, to be found in a specific manner, in a specific place 
and time, in order to differentiate itself from the rest of real world. 
The difference is that the actor on stage is found in principle within this 
frame and in general, he already knows that. For this reason he never loses 
his self-control7. Nevertheless, the actor of the social “stage” is always 
dependent on the place and time of his action, bound by the entire series of 
the consequences of this action8. The framing of his actions always remains 
on the level of the metaphor. An on stage promise maintains its weight until 
the curtain falls, while a promise given in a social relation maintains its 
weight constantly. The doctor of the social stage plays the role of the doctor, 
following the script of his discipline and the practises of his profession, 
formulating in time a case and a plot of action, but without having a 
constant audience attending his specific work and the most important of all, 
without being protected by some framework of action: the eventual death of 
one of his patients always binds him morally, if not legally. 
Another important difference lies in the relation between the subject and 
the role. The actor on stage coincides with his role, (even if, as we know, he 
often does not identify with it), while the actor of the social stage never 
coincides with one of his roles, nor can he be reduced to any set of roles that 
he incarnates9. The self can be seized in no finite set of performance onstage 
nor offstage. “The self is that which escapes all final objectification”, in part 
because the objectifications are unpredictables and indefinites, as Wilshire 
                                                
6 Ivi, p. 260. 
7 R. Schechner, “Magnitudes of performance”, in R. Schechner, W. Appel (eds), By Means of 
Performance. Intercultural Studies of Theatre and Ritual, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1991, pp. 28, 39. 
8 B. Wilshire, Role Playing and Identity, cit., p. 262. 
9 Ivi, p. 263. 
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argues, but primarily because, according to the phenomenological thought, 
conscience as such is an escape from any objectification or definition10. 
An actor is not judged by his life outside the theatre, but solely by the 
quality of his acting in relation to the role he undertakes. For this reason we 
say that, he coincides with his role as an actor, but this automatically 
suggests that he differentiates himself from his role as an individual. 
However, the same does not apply for the “actor” of the social stage: even if 
as a free person he exceeds all of his possible roles, nonetheless he cannot be 
released from the responsibilities resulting from each one individually. 
Besides some extreme psychopathological cases, no one and nothing could 
distinguish in him the self and the “performer”, and no one and nothing 
could neither “soften nor confine the consequences of his acts”11. In social 
life maybe we can counterbalance an action of ours, to overshadow some of 
its aspects or even surpass it, leaving it behind as a memory, however we 
cannot eliminate its traces that follow us everywhere. If the actor walks on 
soft soil, the “actor” of everyday life walks on thin sand. 
Wilshire cannot say it often enough that, besides the differences he 
detects, the theatrical metaphor is essential, but he does that in order to 
cleverly add one more difference. “Nothing we have said”, he writes, “obliges 
us to deny that the role-playing metaphor is an essential one. The concept of 
“performing” may not apply in toto to all that we do offstage, but it is 
inescapable in most of everyday life”, but he adds below, as he wanted to 
limit the power of his last phrase that “the press and shock of events are too 
great, and their outcome is too unpredictable, to adopt a stance of 
detachment strictly analogous to the actor’s toward himself as a 
character”12. 
Following these steps and initially establishing the existing 
differentiations between theatrical and social life, Wilshire arrives at the 
examination of Goffman’s theory about the presentations of self in everyday 
life, as this is developed in this work bearing the same title, but also in his 
subsequent work about the frame analysis. Primarily, he attributes to 
                                                
10 Ivi, p. 266. 
11 Ivi, p. 265. 
12 Ivi, p. 267. 
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Goffman a nominalistic way of thinking that conceives only particles from 
the actor’s work, that considers him as a being that is constantly playing a 
role, but he always differentiates himself from the repertoire of these roles. 
But if the real self is hidden behind the roles then we could either never 
discover it or we will only see an instant and fragmentary image of it, when 
the role “slips” for a moment, like the mask from the face. If the only thing 
we know about the self results only from the management of images it 
projects towards others -that is from a kind of strategic “misleading”- then 
life begins to resemble a farce and loses every tragic dimension. What 
Wilshire maintains is that the distinction between the real self and the 
performed selves is “artificial and misleading” because, a. “what a self really 
is involves integrally how it appears to be to others”13, and b. The real self, 
to the degree where it can become conscious and thus possess the total of 
the performed selves, but also each one separately, does not coincide with 
them, but exceeds them chronologically and thematically. I cannot be but all 
the roles that I perform before others, but what I really am is not limited 
only to these roles, since there is something that always escapes from all the 
framings, that exceeds all the performances of self, that finally establishes 
them as such and that is nothing else but conscience. Conscience is the 
permanently present spectator of our roles, the critic of every act and 
omission of ours, this invisible gaze of our gazes, this fleeting thought of our 
thoughts. Conscience is a power of coherence and a power of transcendence. 
“Yes”, Wilshire will say, “life offstage is a multileveled performance”, 
everywhere in everyday life there are roles and “actors” that embody them, 
there are the multifaceted and consecutive “appearances” of self; but “there 
is no substantial or atomic self behind the appearances”14. Goffman will 
agree with this argument, but what he will leave out is that the most 
important member among the onlookers of my actions is myself as present 
to myself in all my roles15. 
                                                
13 Ivi, p. 279. 
14 Ivi, p. 278. 
15 Wilshire writes: “Goffman has left out the most important member of my “audience”— 
myself, myself as present to myself in all my “roles”. He ignores the self-conscious structure 
of the self, the I-me polarity, one’s accumulating and changing sense of one’s passing life in 
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According to Wilshire, the complete distinction between the moral and 
representative dimension of the action is often difficult yet always real. In 
some crucial cases of social life, such as when personal dignity, social justice 
or even human life are at stake, the representativeness only constitutes the 
surface of things, where ethical dimension is detected within the depths of 
human relationships. In these cases, the theatrical metaphor weakens as 
the distance between its two terms broadens. Therefore, the kaleidoscope of 
social situations, analyzed by Goffman’s dramatic vocabulary, can provide a 
confused image of the relations of theatrical and social life if do not take into 
serious consideration the ethical criterion that ponders our social actions, 
and distinguish the behaviors fabricated for the moment to confront an 
isolated case from those which are accepted in every situation because they 
have a broad institutional and structural potency. Wilshire insists 
particularly on this: 
I am responsible for my behavior offstage in fundamentally different ways from 
my behavior onstage. Ethical responsibility is a condition of the identity of the 
self; […] In aestheticizing behavior through his role theory, Goffman 
contributes to the devitalization of the self. His position, verging on 
nihilism…16 
The image given by the number of the footnotes of Role Playing and Identity 
about Sartre is not indicative regarding the presence of the Frenchman in 
the thinking of the American philosopher. A careful reading of the book 
would find several points where Wilshire “transfers” the thinking of L’être et 
le néant mainly to his own area and applies it on the speculation of the 
theatrical metaphor. A similar reading strays from the objectives of the 
present essay, but we can simply mention the thematic references of bad 
faith, of prefabricated roles, of the corporal “intervention” in the relations of 
self with the other, of the negative character of the conscience, as well as 
and the subject’s transcendence. Thus, when we ascertain from Wilshire’s 
reading that the social person is the total of the selves projecting to others, 
but it is not coincide with it, we can discern behind his words the similar 
                                                                                                                                          
all its episodes, the time-spanning consciousness of self that are integral to the self itself” 
(Ivi, p. 279). 
16 Ivi, p. 280. 
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standpoint of Sartre, that the subject is his body and simultaneously 
something more than his body and, even more, that between the subject and 
his roles there a “nil”, which is nevertheless enough to create a void. The act 
of representation is placed on this void: if the subject pretends to be 
someone else, he is automatically not this other person17. When we read 
that “we cannot be reduced to a set of ‘roles’” and that “we exist over an 
abyss of possibility and freedom”18, we listen to the words of the French 
existentialist regarding the subject’s transcendence, the possibilities of free 
choice an individual has, allowing him to be himself and at the same time 
getting substantially away from himself, and thus be self-defined as pour-
soi. Finally, Wilshire’s view that “the person is the activity that composes 
the experiences beyond the local environments”19 and that the 
transcendental conscience is not one more role, an after-role, but a constant 
elusive and incomprehensible self-meditativeness of conscience, is clearly 
based on Sartre’s view that conscience is not exhausted to its objects nor to 
its choices and obviously refers us to the concepts of the phenomenological 
deduction, where the conscience and the role-as-the-object-of-the-conscience 
constitute an incomplete and deficient relation. In general, behind the 
thought that is developed throughout Role Playing and Identity, lies the 
fundamental position of Sartre according to which the partial choices and 
the current roles adopted by the subject constitute part of a greater game, 
within which the subject finds various ways to express his desire about 
acting, responsible action, namely his desire to exist on the basis of freedom 
and risk20. 
This concept of risk invite us to combine Wilshire’s moral approach of 
phenomenological direction with other criticisms regarding Goffman’s work, 
stemming from the field of sociology, for instance, Judith Butler’s criticism, 
which rejects the objective existence of roles and underlines their artificial 
                                                
17 J-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant, Gallimard, Paris 1986, p. 96. 
18 B. Wilshire, Role playing and identity, cit., p. 282. 
19 Ivi, p. 283. 
20 J-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant, cit., p. 641. 
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construction based on social regulations21, that of Christopher Lash, 
according to which, the analysis of the representative self in everyday life 
ignores the psychological depth of social association22 or even the one of 
Richard Sennett, who supports that Goffman is primarily interested in the 
converging and counterbalancing trends in the framework of social 
relationships and neglects the powers of disorder, disorganization and 
change23. From this point of view, the stages Goffman describes are related 
to the third phase of the social drama, according to Victor Turner’s theory, 
namely, with the efforts of mediatory and redressive actions of the crisis24. 
This discloses an anthropological view taken in advance, according to which 
individuals always seek to establish a status of balance rather than one of 
suspense, they move with centripetal rather than centrifugal actions and for 
this reason they proceed to mutual compromises. 
The desire to act and risk, the psychological depth and the powers of 
disorder and change are the concepts missing from the “dramatic” map of 
Goffman’s society. The situations of the roles described by the sociologist 
often give the impression that despite any oppositions or contestations that 
may be expressed at the beginning of the meetings, ultimately convergence 
and consent will prevail over the actions of individuals and groups. Thus, 
the sense of high existentialist tension, which is noted by Sartre between 
the subject and the other, is lost, as Lash puts it, the complex mental 
processes that often take place during social gatherings are also lost and, in 
default of these procedures, the consenting relationships can more easily 
prevail over the conflicting ones, as stated by Sennett.  
The truth is that the notions Goffman uses are not appropriate for these 
kinds of approaches required by the above scholars. However, it should be 
noted that, at least as far as Wilshire’s criticism is concerned, Goffman is 
                                                
21 J. Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution”, in S-E. Case (ed.), Performing 
Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre, Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more 1990, p. 279. 
22 C. Lash, The Culture of Narcissism (1979), Nisides, Athens (n.d.), p. 98. 
23 R. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, Nefeli, Athens 1999, p. 257. 
24 V. Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play, Performing Arts 
Journal Publications, New York 1982, pp. 68-72. See also his study: “Are there universals of 
performance in myth, ritual, and drama?”, in R. Schechner, W. Appel (eds.), By Means of 
Performance. Intercultural Studies of Theatre and Ritual, cit. 
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not interested in constituting a generalized theory of social relations and for 
this reason his conclusions are not referenced on a universal level, but are 
approaches and descriptions of individual relations on the level of the 
focused meetings or the situated activity systems25. Certainly, these 
descriptions, to the degree that they only focus on the social self as a vehicle 
of a pre-established role, seem quite formalistic, but do not aim at the 
aestheticization of social behavior in any way. We should keep in mind that 
the raising of the limits between the theatre and social life is not attempted 
anywhere in his work. On the contrary, an effort is made, even if it is not 
systematic, to establish a set of criteria of distinction of the two worlds26. 
Theatrical metaphor and its extensive applications prove that life is 
theatrelike, but this does not mean that the entire world is a theatre27: the 
theatrelike life makes the limits of the world and that of the theatre 
indiscernible28. If Goffman’s analyses allow only a part of the self to be seen, 
this does not mean that they contribute to the weakening of the self as an 
entity. Besides, the systematic use of the theatrical metaphor in his work, 
on the one hand functions as a scaffolding, constituting the framework of a 
structure that is later removed29, and on the other hand, it provides an 
enchanting tour in the empirical places of the individual and collective 
action, where the subject draws from the reservoirs of social behavior, 
turning towards some standardized actions, in order to cope with everyday 
association and arduous competition. Using Goffman’s theory about the 
social roles as a starting point, new horizons could be opened either towards 
therapy by means of drama, where, as Robert J. Landy supports, the role 
                                                
25 About the concept of the situated activity system, see E. Goffman, Encounters. Two Stud-
ies in the Sociology of Interaction, The Bobbs-Merill Company Inc, Indianapolis 1961. 
26 E. Goffman, Les cadres de l’expérience, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1991, pp. 145-150. 
27 According to Blau, “the notion that in life there is nothing but theater”, is distressing and 
maybe crippling. See H. Blau, Take up the Bodies. Theater at the Vanishing Point, Universi-
ty of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago 1982, p. 252. 
28 E. Goffman, La mise en scène de la vie quotidienne, cit., p. 73. 
29 Eli Rozik notes: “The problem is that after taking down the scaffold, the theatrical termi-
nology used in describing the human world still remains and creates an unprecedented 
phenomenon on language: two realms so intimately related as the world and one of its 
means of description are categorized by the same words”. See E. Rozik, The Roots of Thea-
tre. Rethinking Ritual and Other Theories of Origin, University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 
2002, p. 187. 
 Itinera, N. 13, 2017. Pagina 102 
 
from a metaphorical notion is perceived as an autonomous one30, or towards 
a moral philosophy of social relations, as Wilshire would probably have 
wished, where the subject is perceived as a spectator of himself, or, finally, 
towards new and original compositions in a “theatrosociology” field, as Uri 
Rapp attempted in 197031. In all of the three cases, the theatrological 
thought has a lot to receive from the broader comprehension of its objects 
and also a lot to give to the research of the adjacent fields.  
The paratheatrical phenomena  
Wilshire will insist on the issue regarding limits, and eight years after the 
publication of Role Playing and Identity, his moral speculation, set forth in 
his book about the moral degradation of universities32, will be applied again 
in the field of the theatrical metaphor, with his essay: “The Concept of the 
Paratheatrical”. Paratheatrical performances are all those that violate, one 
way or another, the impermeability of the limits existing between the 
theatrical game and the “outside” world, leaving spectators wondering 
whether the show they are viewing is an artistic performance33. The 
examples that are chosen here are drawn from extreme cases of 
performances: for instance, Rafael Ortiz’s, The Sky is Falling, in 1970, a 
performance referring to the Vietnam War, Chris Burden’s, Shooting Piece 
in 1971 or the performance of the Italian experimental group Magazzini 
Criminali in the middle of the 80s during the Sant’ Arcangelo Festival. The 
violent murders of animals or the performers shooting themselves, as a 
means of achieving aesthetic goals, remain of a doubtful quality, while on 
the contrary they create confusion and distress to the audience. For this 
reason, one could easily define their difference from an artistic performance, 
setting as a limit for instance, the respect and the protection of life. Thus 
                                                
30 R.J. Landy, Persona and Performance, Hellinika Grammata, Athens 2001, p. 62. 
31 U. Rapp, Handeln und Zuschauen. Untersuchungen uber den theatersoziologischen aspekt 
in der menschlichen interaktion, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, Darmstadt und Neuwied 
1973. 
32 B. Wilshire, The Moral Collapse of the University: Professionalism, Purity, and Aliena-
tion, State University of New York Press, New York 1990. 
33 B. Wilshire, “The concept of the paratheatrical”, The Drama Review, 34, 4, 1990, pp. 169-
178 (170). 
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the question is put expressly: “If human beings are injured”, during the 
performance, “then how can the venture be justified in mere aesthetic 
terms?”34. Of course, there are similar limits in other cases, too, like for 
instance, in war games or Roman arenas of lethal combat. Nevertheless, a 
limit does not only separate, but it also directly connects the two parts it 
separates, since while it denotes the end of one part, it announces the 
beginning of the other. This double function of limits, however, also allows 
the development of the theatrical metaphor. 
That is why Wilshire admits that “there is an element of performance in 
all human skills and professions”35. In addition, he will note that “if we are 
to be socialized and human we must always ‘perform’ in some way, it seems. 
The urge to blur the line between fiction and fact stems from human life 
itself”36. An expression of this trend sometimes occurs at a cocktail party, 
where the participants behave as real people, as specific individual 
personalities and not as fictional people. Therefore, the dividing lines get 
blurred, but are not eliminated. The possibility that their behavior may 
contain “disguises” or “masks” does not reduce in the least their real 
commitment to their interrelations. That means that their behaviors also 
accompany them after the end of the party. “Hence if we talk of fictionality 
at the party we must load it with heavy inverted commas to indicate how 
extraordinarily far we have stretched the term”37. Certainly, this remark 
applies to all the paratheatrical events, as well as to children’s mimetic 
games. In both cases, what is obviously missing and finally differentiates 
these behaviors from the theatrical activity itself, is the intentional 
detachment from the self, the premeditated and coordinated distance the 
actor creates from himself in order to approach and embody his role. 
Thus, on the one hand there is the urge for the performativity, while on 
the other the limits of intentionality and integrity of human existence are 
set. In this tug of war, the intrinsic human need for action is necessarily 
interwoven with the “performances” each act presupposes. These 
                                                
34 Ivi, p. 175. 
35 Ivi, p. 174. 
36 Ivi, p. 175. 
37 Ivi, p. 172. 
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performances offer to the subject a frame, namely, a protected field of action, 
without which it would run severe risks during its everyday association. 
Hence for Wilshire, every theatrelike performance, theatrical and 
paratheatrical, “is inherently limited, circumscribed within a larger domain 
of human action and experience”38. Which are these restrictions? There are 
two mentioned: of the temporal opening, that gives a delimited duration of 
the “spectacle”, and of the revising ability, where the performer outlives the 
performance that gives and has the ability to assess and revise it. If these 
two restrictions do not apply, the “performance” is nothing but a strong 
metaphor. Thus, Wilshire confirms his initial distinction between the 
aesthetic and the moral sphere of the human being, stressing that 
overlooking this distinction attests megalomania and distortion of the 
human perception. He closes his essay referring to the issue of death: “Even 
if the persons killed were convicted felons, and the authorities had 
determined that they were to die, it is not a playful act to kill them as a part 
of an alleged performance. If I were such a felon, could I regard my own 
death as a playful event?”39. 
Death performances? 
The answer to that question and indeed an affirmative one is given by 
Marvin Carlson through his essay “Theatre History, Methodology and 
Distinctive”. He argues that history is full of cases, where the condemned to 
death transform their last moments to a kind of performance40, aiming 
towards the benefit of their spectators or to a posthumous fame. These 
people “perform” their death in such a way, like the actor plays his role, 
before the audience, supplying their “performances” with expressive ways 
from their familiar cultural tradition or they develop variations of their own 
in order to achieve the desired result. As much as it may initially surprise 
us, this counterargument is accompanied by two indicative examples: the 
public execution of Thomas Crammet in the years of Mary Tudor and the 
                                                
38 Ivi, p. 177. 
39 Ivi, p. 178. 
40 See also R. Schechner, Performance Studies  An Introduction, Routledge, London & New 
York 2002, pp. 176-179. 
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advice Hugh Latimer offers to Nicholas Ridley as they stand over their 
common funeral fire. Carlson notes that in both cases, the “protagonists” 
were aware of the representative element in their execution ceremony and 
that they used it to impress their audience and somehow influence somehow 
future events. He also adds that these death performances may be 
considered as “playful” act, if the “game” is considered to be within the 
framework of an action with extremely serious consequences41. 
We could reinforce Carlson’s sampling by mentioning two more known 
examples: those of Augustus Caesar and Nero. They both considered 
themselves as artists where, at the time of death, they leave the stage. The 
first one asked his friends if “the mime of life (the mimus vitae) had played 
his role well through the end” and asked them to applaud in case they liked 
the play, while the latter was wondering: “what kind of artist will be lost 
with me?”42. However, could we add many more examples? Is it possible for 
death to be considered beyond the limits of a bold metaphor, as the ultimate 
theatrical gesture of a person, who is aware that the gaze of the others is 
fixed upon him during his last moments? The Cynic and the Stoic 
philosophers, as the neoplatonists, have left quite solid foundations, even in 
the 16th and 17th century, regarding the theatrical metaphor of life as a play, 
that is completed with the third act – and it is precisely this third act that 
requires great attention during its execution: memento mori!43 
However all these do not escape from the limits of a metaphor and most 
importantly, they can only be established by the standpoint of a systematic 
observer of the phenomenon of life and not by the standpoint of the dying 
subject, as Wilshire has already stated. We cannot have the conscience that 
the dying subject has, while we are still alive. The only thing we can do is to 
observe this horrible procedure of departure, but we cannot directly 
experience it as a departure of our own. On the other hand, an actor on 
stage can give such a performance, by representing a character’s death, 
                                                
41 M. Carlson, “Theatre History, Methodology and Distinctive”, Theatre Research Interna-
tional, 20, 2, 1995, pp. 90-96 (95). 
42 In J-C. Moretti, Théâtre et société dans la Grèce antique, Patakis, Athens 2004, p. 242. 
43 About this issue see L. G. Christian, Theatrum mundi. The history of an idea, Garland 
Publishing, New York & London 1987. 
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because he places it in the temporal horizon of his own life. But the dying 
“actor” of the social stage does not have this horizon and furthermore he is 
not before spectators who can participate in the event as if it was a 
theatrical event, since in a situation of real death the performance is 
engulfed in the dark pain of death. Certainly, both examples evoked by 
Carlson presuppose a transcendental audience that can face death as such 
and this kind of audience adds up to divine presence. In fact, the spectators 
of both examples see certain people dying and not some “actors” playing 
their own death. Only God can see it, because only He can offer the temporal 
horizon of life after death, where the “actor” is called to integrate the 
performance of his death, to self-evaluate his performance aesthetically or 
otherwise, but also to be assessed by the utmost spectator. In this 
dimension, Carlson’s argument finds a certain support, but as Wilshire 
aptly says, the inverted commas in the words “actor” and “performance” 
“weigh so heavily on the words that they settle into a domain different from 
that of theatre”44. 
We should differentiate Wilshire’s intentions regarding the demarcation 
of the theatrical metaphor, from this vertical distinction between moral 
philosophy and theatrology, moral and artistic thinking or social reality and 
theatrical narration. The American philosopher does not radically oppose 
moral will to fiction, he does not intend to enclose theatrical activity within 
a stationary structure or a still form. Nowhere in his texts can a hint be 
found about the restriction of the social scope of the theatre, as Carlson 
accuses him45. On the contrary: because he is aware of the great influence 
he can exercise on social life, he tries to set certain theoretical limits 
between the two worlds. 
As a consequence, the standpoints of the two scholars are not as 
irreconcilable as they initially seem. Here we should focus our attention on 
two points. 
Firstly, many of the viewpoints Wilshire formulates are, according to 
Carlson’s viewpoint, intelligent and stimulating, that is the reason why he 
                                                
44 B. Wilshire, Role playing and identity, cit., p. 273. 
45 M. Carlson, “Theatre History, Methodology and Distinctive”, cit., p. 95. 
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does not entirely disagree with him. He himself accepts, in another essay, as 
a particular characteristic of the “theatrical” performance the performers’s 
and audience’s conscience that interpret social life and civilization, explore 
the self and the other, the experienced world and the alternative capabilities 
of its comprehension46. This point of view agrees with Wilshire’s, according 
to which, because “a human existence is not a substance, and it holds an 
indefinitely large fund of unobjectifiability, creativity, and freedom”, the 
truths that theatre offers us disturb the obviousnesses of the world and give 
rise to more questions than answers. These questions induce incertitude, as 
well as an effort of interpretation of human life and the world. And this 
effort is possible because, as Wilshire writes, referring indirectly to the 
Platonic Cave, “each insight we achieve in the luminous focus of art casts a 
penumbra of uncertainty”47. 
A second point with which Carlson would gladly agree with is the 
indefinability of the limits of theatrical art and hence the coherent fluidity 
of the epistemological criteria by means of which the definition of the limits 
is attempted. However, this indefinability renders theatricality a 
particularly creative factor of aesthetic pleasure and, in general, of the 
social actions, or, as Carlson would state it: “a positive, indeed celebrative 
expression of human potential”48. In addition, he himself, considers the 
strict definition of scientific territories and the protection of the supposed 
purity of the cognitive fields a waste of time and a fruitless effort. On the 
contrary, he focuses on the permeable limits that offer new occasions for 
research, on the clever and sensitive exploitation of material and methods 
coming from adjacent fields, as well as from relevant artistic and non 
artistic expressions, and on the adoption of more pragmatic concerns, that 
do not require delimitations of a universal range, but can allow alternative 
and case-based approaches. This kind of goal setting distances us from 
questions such as: “what are the methods and subject matter of theatre 
history?” and encourages quests such as: “what research strategies are 
                                                
46 M. Carlson, Performance. A Critical Introduction, cit. p. 196. 
47 B. Wilshire, Role playing and identity, cit., pp. 254-255. 
48 M. Carlson, “The Resistance to Theatricality”, SubStance, 31, 2/3, 2002, pp. 238-250 
(p. 249). 
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available to me from whatever field that will allow me to ask the most 
productive questions about the historiography project that I am currently 
pursuing?”.49 Wilshire on the other hand, recognizes that we can not focus 
on theatre through a super epistemological point of view in order to 
ascertain its limitations. Each mode of scientific activity concerning theatre 
must be open to supplementation and correction from any other mode, since 
each selected point of view conceals more elements than it can disclose and 
there is no total perspective that overlaps all partial points of view. Hence, 
every truth revealed by theatre art “can be revealed only through an 
immeasurable upsurge of human transcendence, creativity, community, and 
freedom”50. 
                                                
49 M. Carlson, “Theatre History, Methodology and Distinctive”, cit., p. 96. 
50 B. Wilshire, Role playing and identity, cit., p. 256. 
